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The one recurring theme in my work has been violence. The love of the sanguine side of history 
was sowed here at Trent when, as a fourth year student in search of a research topic for my 
directed studies course, Elwood Jones pointed me toward the 1841 election riot in Toronto. I 
became fascinated with the spectacle of collective violence. That paper on Toronto grew into a 
masters’ thesis at Queens’ on rioting in the city in the 1840s. From there I went to the University 
of Maryland, where my dissertation on North American canal construction centrally concerned 
canaller riots. Thereafter, it was but a matter of degree to scale to the heights of violence and to 
study state-based mass killing, aka warfare. As I matured as a historian I came to appreciate how 
useful moments of violence are in recovering the history of people located at the bottom or 
margins of the social structure. Rank in file Orange Lodge members, canal navies, and common 
soldiers had been rendered largely mute by the passage of time. This was in part due to their low 
level of literacy, and the fact they had left few first-person accounts of their lives. It also derived 
from the political economy of the Anglo-American world in the 18th and 19th centuries that 
isolated plebeians and proletarians apart from the historical record at that same time that it 
alienated them from the fruits of their labor. Acts of violence on their part, however, forced their 
way into the authoritarian narrative, which read against the grain, can shed much light on their 
experience. As a result, the vast majority of my efforts to locate the lower ranks has involved 
pastiche, sorting through numerous records, pulling out the evidenciary fragments addressing 
their lives, and assembling a mosaic that purports to capture the complex whole. Rare is the 
document that provides a coherent and comprehensive account of live in the lower orders. When 
such a treasure is unearthed, however, it can be juxtaposed to and joined with the fragmented 
view for a resolution comparable to the master narrative.  
In this vein, James Miller’s memoir allows the historian to engage more closely the front 
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rank experience of warfare, and thereby, to interrogate the elitist biases of military history. 
Miller, a common soldier of the 15th regiment, wrote of his service in the British army during 
Seven Years’ War and sent his memoir in 1792, to Sir Jeffery Amherst, his former commander, 
with a letter requesting a promotion to a lieutenancy. He humbly noted in his preface: "It is very 
possible that some may think it impertinent, others presumptious, for so humble an individual 
presuming to give a Narrative, which contains nothing of novelty, or in any degree equal to many 
in the army”.i However, unlike the provincial troops of the colonies, few regular soldiers left 
written narratives of their military service in the war.ii Moreover, Miller participated in many of 
the key battles of the Seven Years’ War, and thus provides a much more complete rank and file 
narrative of the conflict. And, despite the fact that his memoirs constituted a petition to Amherst, 
they provide candid evaluations of his military service and his commanding officers. In this, it is 
exceptional, being a rare narrative of a common soldier’s engagement with warmaking that was 
“not intended, for the public eye,”iii and thus not sanitized so as to appeal to subscribers or a 
wider reading public. The journal allows a critical reading of British imperial military enterprise, 
revealing soldiers’ fundamental role in the making of Britain’s American Empire. 
 
“To have the happiness, of being born a Briton”iv 
James Miller made “his first appearance” in the world in the north of Britain “on the wrong side 
of the Tweed, A part of the kingdom justly obnoxious to all ‘true born Englishmen’.” Though 
from North Britain, he nonetheless embraced his status as a Briton. Such a conflicted identity, 
being both of the vaunted “race” of Britons, but of secondary status due to his northern roots, 
informs Miller’s telling of his life story as a soldier, enabling both a patriotic embrace of British 
accomplishment of arms, and a cynical understanding of the class and ethnic dynamics that 
imbricated the military’s command structure. To be a Briton at the time of the Seven Years’ War 
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meant to be at the center of a particular configuration of material forces and imperial state power.  
To reorient the history of early modern warfare away from its typical nation state based 
proclivities, it has to be set in the context of the transition to capitalism, and to place state-
sponsored armed conflict in the context of imperial aggrandizement in the interests of merchant 
capital. The Early Modern era witnessed what historians of warfare have called a military 
revolution, involving relatively swift technological and organizational innovation and marked 
growth in the scale and intensity of armed conflict, developments which had profound 
implications for both state and society.v Often discussed in curiously bloodless terms of military 
innovation or state formation. Empire comprised the larger theater of military revolution, where 
imperial state formation occurred at the expense of soldiers, indigenous peoples and colonists. 
The war machine provided the force necessary to the creation of international merchant capital 
and its protection within the imperial sphere.vi  
The Seven Years’ War constituted an important catalyst to these processes.vii The War 
marked a significant turning point in the nature of Empire from being distinctly commercial to 
being increasingly territorial.viii The army was an essential player in the winning of this territorial 
empire, and the empire was increasingly dependent on the army for its defense.ix The army’s red 
coat would become a more striking signifier of imperial rule than the navy’s blue jacket. In terms 
of the sheer numbers of troops mobilized, the scale of combat, and the massive investment in 
military supply and infrastructure, this was warfare as yet unseen in the Americas. The Seven 
Years’ War principally concerned the acquisition of territories, raw materials, peoples, and 
markets in the Americas, in India and Africa.  In making war, soldiers built empire. 
This reading of events would seem to cast soldiers as unwitting instruments of state policies, 
the stuff of traditional imperial history. By comparison, the new imperial history adopts a 
subaltern approach.x Soldiers, I argue, provide a link between such histories from above and 
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below, as they are both instruments and objects of imperial authority. As members of armies 
engaged in warfare of acquisition and defense, they were the myrmidons of expansive 
commercial imperialism; as individuals enlisted from diverse backgrounds into a dangerous 
occupation jacketed with restricting discipline, they comprised expropriated labor yoked to 
imperial design, alienated from civil society, and bracketed at the bottom of the social structure.  
The story of James Miller captures both dimensions to soldiering. His martial labor 
contributed to the imperial design of violent expropriation, but the state appropriated his labor to 
its own ends, in the process exposing him to the very real physical dangers of empire making. 
His consciousness of this exploitation of the soldier grew over time, and it is no coincidence that 
the final “battle” he recounted in the Seven Years’ War was a mutiny that occurred in Quebec in 
1763, part of a general mutiny pitting common troops against their officers that wracked the 
army at war’s end. 
 
Taking the King’s Shilling 
Miller’s recounted his enlistment nostalgically. “From the earliest recollection, the hearing a 
drumbeat, set the heart on fire! A soldier, in my idea, must be the first of mortals, being the 
guardian of his country. Often did I throw myself in their way, wishing to be taken notice of, at 
last in the year 1756 at a very tender age, had the happiness, as I then thought! Of being singled 
out, by one of those worthies called crimps, who deal in human flesh, he enter’d into 
conversation, praised the life, of a soldier, profer’d Gold and every good which was soon 
accepted of, and now behold me, in the high road to honor. The first night passed in delirium! 
But on the morning, being hurried away, without having permission to bid farewell to our dear 
relatives, for there were several boys of us, what grief, what sorrowing many a long and 
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lingering look we cast behind during the first days march, but the grief went off, as the distance 
increas’d.”xi  
Miller was but one of thousands entering the army in 1756-57, as Britain mobilized to fight 
France on both sides of the Atlantic. The exponential increase in the size of the army in America 
during the Seven Years’ War—from about 2000 men in 1755 to roughly 25,000 regulars in 
1761—necessitated massive recruitment.xii The army went about raising troops in a number of 
ways. Recruitment of volunteers like James Miller constituted the main means of stocking this 
work force.xiii Lieutenant Colonel Campbell Dalrymple's claim that soldiers were “the scum of 
every county, the refuse of mankind”xiv was the prevalent attitude, but closer scrutiny of soldiers' 
economic backgrounds reveals them to be more so the salt of the earth, ordinary people 
mobilized from the land and the trades either through dwindling opportunity or by the lure of the 
bounty money—near 50 per cent of the British American army came from skilled backgrounds.xv 
In the colonies the military found willing volunteers among indentured servants, who “are glad 
to goe [sic] into the Army to get rid of their Slavery.”xvi Other men were pressed into service by 
government legislation that specifically targeted the unemployed.xvii 
Army recruitment had roots in socioeconomic change. For some enlistment entailed a form 
of proletarianization; artisans immiserated by or rendered surplus to needs of crafts undergoing 
the reorganization of production preparatory to industrialization found the wage offered by 
soldiering a last recourse, or were scooped up by the press as men without means. To indentured 
servants, proletarian status constituted a welcome escape from bondage. For others already 
reduced to laboring status, military work amounted to but another form of manual labor, more 
dangerous of course, but offering steady employment, food, clothing and accommodation. In 
hard economic times, such as in the late 1750s when army recruiting peaked, it could be seen as 
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the lesser of evils. Volunteer or pressed, then, there was an element of coercion at work for most 
army recruits. 
 
France 
As James Miller’s corps marched into Portsmouth, he first confronted the imperial war machine 
in which he constituted but a small cog. He marveled at the “Dock Yard, the blacksmiths shop, in 
particular, where they were forming anchors of prodigious magnitude,” as well as the naval 
might in port. “The stupendous size of the men of war, on the stocks, and those under repair, 
strike the eye of every beholder.” xviii Lost in his youthful wonderment at the scale of martial 
enterprise, he was naturally blinded to the logical outcome of all this activity—bloody warfare 
that would exact its toll on many thousands. When the order came for his corps to set sail on a 
secret expedition, he could still exclaim: “what cheerfulness in every countenance, with the 
glorious expectation of soon seeing a battle!”xix 
Twenty sail of the line, many frigates and 300 transports set sail for points unknown to 
Miller. The leisure of the voyage gave him time to reflect on his situation. 
 
The accommodation of soldiers, on board ship, are not very conducive to ease or 
health, all between decks being separated by boards into births, of six foot by six, 
three feet, six inches high, one tier, over the other, four or five men are allotted to 
each birth, and they creep into their holes, in the best manner they can, one third 
of which, are generally kept on deck while at anchor. I seldom went below for 
there proceeds, such a Disagreeable Stench, of putrid breaths when you are going 
down the hatch way, that no being, accustomed to fresh air, can bear.xx  
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Miller experienced first hand the commonplace for soldiers, whether at sea or on land: cramped, 
uncomfortable, obnoxious and unhealthy living conditions. When a strong gale hit the fleet, he 
experienced severe sea sickness. Such travails prompted him to realize his mistake. “[I]t was 
then, my folly, stared me full in the face, and repentance came too late, for having embraced, a 
life, of so much misery.”xxi 
Miller’s remorse deepened as a result of his first campaign. The fleet, under command of 
Commodore Howe, sailed along the French coast into the Bay of Biscay near Aix, where a 
fortification was bombarded and grenadiers landed to take the town and French prisoners. After 
this auspicious start, the expedition did little but sail further along the coast before sail was set 
for England. This turn of events mortified Miller, who admitted, “we certainly cut but a poor 
figure, on our return, and were frequently insulted, in our quarters, as if soldiers, were 
answerable, for the conduct of their superiors. I was now, pretty well cured, of all the romantic 
notions, imbibed in youth, and have had some cause, to lament, the wrong bias, of education”.xxii  
 
New France 
Miller sailed for North America in 1758, in May arriving at Cape Breton and the French citadel 
of Louisbourg, gateway to the St. Lawrence and New France. General Jeffery Amherst ordered 
the troops loaded into flat boats for an amphibious assault, despite what Miller called “a great 
swell.”  
 
Every precaution, had been taken by the enemy, to oppose our landing, the whole 
shore was one continuous battery, and the french troops, were concealed, from 
our sight by branches of trees, cut down. They reserved their fire until our boats 
got near the shore, when such a tremenduous [sic] one commenced, from their 
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great guns, and small arms, as I have never since, beheld! Several boats, were 
sunk, others overset, by the swell, a boat carrying our grenadier company, was 
sunk by which, one Officer, two Serjeants, and thirty fine fellows were lost.xxiii  
 
James Wolfe, who commanded the assault, identified a part of the shoreline, where the army 
landed and over the course of the next few days, cannon were brought ashore and trained on the 
French artillery emplacement and ships in the harbor. These were all rendered useless, the British 
artillery advanced and several breeches were made in the fortification. The anticipated “orders to 
storm them” were preempted by the French surrender.xxiv Miller noted: “Thus with much 
perserverance, loss and fatigue, we had taken the strongest Garrison in Nth. America, and opened 
the road to Canada.”xxv 
Early in the Spring of 1759, Miller’s regiment joined the campaign against the heart of New 
France. Miller compresses the campaign against Quebec, which lasted several months, in his 
narrative, skimming over General Wolfe’s increasingly desparate efforts to find a way of getting 
his army safely across the river and in a defensible position outside the city, and instead 
concentrates on the ultimate battle, not surprising in that strategizing is the domain of generals 
and fighting falls to soldiers. Finally, in September, Wolfe identified a cove upstream from 
Quebec, where he believed the cliffs could be scaled. The troops rowed past Quebec at night in 
flat boats with oars muffled, landed at the cove and ascending the heights, securing position on 
the Plains of Abraham, where the enemy marched out to join them in battle. 
 
The french army, collected from their different posts, were formed in two lines, 
with Indians and Canadians in front, they attacked us with great spirit, however 
our men reserved their fire, until the enemy, was within forty paces, when every 
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shot told [?], and the french were repulsed almost immediately and drove from the 
field. 
 
With the French general, Montcalm, dead, and their army in flight, the city soon yielded to the 
British. xxvi This is a rather sketchy rendering of the soldiers’ story of the fall of Quebec. Miller 
reserves more color for the victory’s emotional centerpiece: “the great loss to our army which 
check’d our joy was the [?] Commander in Chief, Wolfe, who fell, after receiving three wounds. 
However he met with the most happy, the most glorious death, that a soldier could wish.”xxvii The 
second great piece of French dominion in North America had tumbled to British might of arms. 
The British fleet provisioned the regiments left to garrison Quebec, Miller’s among them, 
and sailed down the St. Lawrence before the river froze up. Interestingly, his account of the 
hardships endured that winter achieves greater depth than did his rendition of the battle for 
Quebec. 
 
A severe winter, now commenced, while we were totally unprepared, for such a 
climate, neither fewel [fuel], forage, or indeed anything, to make life tolerable. 
The troops, were crouded into vacant houses, as well as possible, numbers fell 
sick, and the scurvy made a dreadful havock among us. The duty became 
extremely hard, for after being up all night, on guard, the men were obliged to go 
near six miles, through the snow, to cut wood, and then to drag it home on 
Sledges. From the severe frost, the wood was as hard as marble, and Europeans, 
who had never been accustomed to cut wood, made but small progress, a constant, 
and daily supply, was however necessary, and required the greatest perserverance 
[sic]. In short, the fatigues of the winter was so great, that the living, almost 
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envied the dead. . . . Many men, lost the use of their hands, and feet, during the 
winter. I was also frost bit, in the right foot, while on guard . . . however by taking 
it in time, lost no bones.xxviii 
 
In April, a French army attacked Quebec. The smaller British army marched out to give 
battle, “but the french line, when hid by the bushes, kept up a fire, and with such effect, as threw 
us into confusion.” Miller’s regiment took refuge in a hollow that shielded it from French 
musketry. It advanced again, which gave the French “an opportunity of cutting us up, they being 
drawn up under cover, and taking aim at leisure . . . In short, in half an hour, ten Officers, from 
Twenty, were dropped, twelve Serjeants, from twenty four, and near two hundred, rank and file, 
from less than four hundred in the field! The corps was broken, and retreated to their former 
ground, happy would it have been, had they never left it.” The remainder of the British army 
fared no better and retreated “confusedly” to Quebec in defeat. The British lost some 2000 men 
in the battle.  They were only spared the loss of the city by the serendipitous arrival of a British 
fleet, causing the French to decamp.xxix Thus, Miller’s first experience of military defeat turned 
into a victory of sorts, yet his painful recording of the “butcher’s bill” of casualties suggests a 
further souring of his view of military life. 
Miller enjoyed but a brief respite, as his corps joined the expedition against Montreal. 
Amherst had planned a three-pronged attack on the city. As well as the fleet advancing from 
Quebec, he himself led a army from Lake Ontario and another advanced up Lake Champlain. 
The three armies met outside Montreal at the same time, and the French, surrounded on all 
fronts, yielded to the British. Miller reported: 
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A Capitulation took place, and all Canada was given up, a Country of more extent 
than Britain, and Ireland, inhabited by at least, one hundred thousand inhabitants. 
. . Thus after a series of hardships, in a climate, unknown to british constitutions, 
an immense country was added to the British Empire, a country producing every 
necessary for man. We flatter’d ourselves, with the hopes of enjoying repose, 
after such fatigues, but was disappointed.xxx  
 
Miller’s corps was ordered to Crown Point on Lake Champlain, where “they were employed in 
raising a fort, but for what purpose, it is unknown, except, to enrich some individuals, for by the 
conquest of Canada, there was no enemy to dread, in that Quarter.”xxxi Here, we can see Miller’s 
cynicism about the military and it priorities increasing, a theme that soon becomes dominant in 
his memoirs. After a month of such construction work they were ordered to New York, from 
whence they departed on an expedition for the West Indies.xxxii 
 
The Caribbean Islands 
William Pitt had instructed Amherst to provide 6,000-8,000  troops for Monckton’s campaign 
against Martinique. Although Miller does not mention it in his memoirs, he likely felt trepidation 
at being posted to the West Indies. Military service in the Caribbean was notorious for its high 
mortality in war and peace, yellow fever and malaria being the main killers.xxxiii 
On Christmas Eve, 1761, Monckton arrived at the Barbadoes with 10 different regiments and 
some companies of American Rangers. The fleet then left for Martinique, where the British 
forces made a landing and advanced on the battery under heavy enemy fire.xxxiv Miller was 
injured in the action. 
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As we were entering the works . . . a musket ball grazed my neck, which in a few 
moments swelled to such a degree, that I thought I should have choaked and 
attempted to swallow water, but could not, I contin’d with the company in the 
Situation, the afternoon, and part of the next day when the Surgeon fearing, a 
mortification, sent me on board an hospital ship, where I remain’d in the same 
deplorable state three days, at last when all hopes of life was over, a violent 
perspiration came on, the swelling subsided, and I was soon able to join the 
corps.xxxv 
 
During his illness, the army had encircled the fort and the garrison surrendered. The island did so 
shortly afterward, followed soon thereafter by St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent.xxxvi  “Thus a 
conquest was made, of the capital of the french Islands in those seas, it was [?] striking at the 
root of their strength, in that quarter, and almost totally anniliated, their West India trade.”xxxvii 
War with France had effectively ended, but the victory came at the near cost of James Miller’s 
life.  
War having been declared on Spain in January 1762, the government’s next objective 
became Havana. The inexperienced Earl of Albemarle, given command of the invasion force, 
brought 4000 men from England to combined with Monckton’s troops, making for an army of 
14,000.xxxviii Yet sickness had already sapped Monckton’s victors of Martinique, being “very 
sickly, many dead, and the sick list increasingly daily.”xxxix  
The army made a landing on Cuba in early June, and began its slow advance on the 
fortifications guarding Havana, under fire of Spanish ships and repeated assaults by enemy 
troops. Miller wrote That “the fatigues of this Siege pass description, the foundation, being a 
solid rock, an no earth to cover us, part of the army, were employed in bring sand bags, two 
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miles distance, amidst showers of grape shot. The soldiers named this road bloody lane!”  
Unfortunately, the battery they built, “the labour of several weeks”, caught fire and was reduced 
to ruins, and they “had the whole work, to begin again, in this burning climate, when the men 
were less able, to perform that duty, being already exhausted, by the excessive fatigues.” 
Moreover, “the bad water brought on disorders, which were mortal, you would see the mens 
tongues hanging out parch’d like a mad dogs, a dollar was frequently given for a quart of 
water.”xl On July 27, Amherst reinforcements arrived.xli Surrounded, outnumbered and its 
defenses breeched, Havana finally fell in mid-August. Miller recounted:   
 
a capitulation took place, when the city, with all the riches, contained therein, 
eleven ships of war, exclusive of other vessels, fell into our hands. The wealth 
found in the custom house, was immense, the whole suppos’d to amount to near 
four millions sterling! Little however came to the share of Non commission’d 
Officers, and private men, owing to the two commanders in chief sharing one 
third of the whole between them! How far this was consistent with equity must be 
submitted to posterity, and whether after the most extraordinary fatigues, in such a 
climate, the blood of britons should be lavish’d to agrandize individuals. By the 
above conquest the key to all the riches, in america were in our hands.”xlii 
 
Havana yielded booty worth £368,000 to the army. Private soldiers who participated in the siege 
each received just over £4 as their share; a tidy sum, but a pittance when compared to the 
princely £122,697 Lord Albemarle earned for his questionable generalship.xliii  
The cost for this stupendous victory was high. Approximately 1,800 British troops had died 
during the siege, while thousands were wounded or had become sick. Then the real dying began. 
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Miller remembered: “The army, in general became sickly, after marching into town.”xliv With no 
real hospital, the British had to use tents and a large storehouse for the many sick. Fresh food 
being very scare, the sick were fed with salt provisions. In mid-October it was reported that 273 
men had been killed during the siege; 246 had died by their wounds; and 4,380 had died by 
sickness.xlv Miller’s 15th regiment was one of the unlucky ones left behind to garrison Havana, 
exposed to illness and avaricious provisioners alike,xlvi which exacerbated the grievance felt from 
the inequitable distribution of booty. The manner of the garrison’s withdrawal from Havana 
cemented this cleavage.  
When peace was declared in 1763, Miller and his mates “flatter’d ourselves, with the hopes, 
of soon being relieved from this unhealthy climate, an event that did not take place for more than 
six months after.”xlvii In June 1763, word was received that Cuba was to be returned to Spain, and 
the departing British troops believed that they were heading home to England. “We now enjoyed 
in Idea, the happiness of being blessed once more, with a sight of all that is dear to man, his 
country, parents &ca &ca.” “But alas! there is nothing certain under the sun for before we 
cleared the gulph of Florida, a packet from England fell in with the fleet, she brought orders, for 
a distribution of the troops, our Corps, was order’d back to Canada.” “It is astonishing, what 
effect this disappointment had on some of the men, several of whom absolutely fell sick and 
died! Others never held up their heads untill we arrived at N. York, which was near three weeks 
after.”xlviii There, they immediately set off by boat up the Hudson to Albany, and began the long 
march to Quebec. 
 
General Mutiny 
I have always been an advocate for rigid discipline, knowing the absolute 
necessity of it. But here it was carried to a degree of excess, never before known 
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in the Corps. Marched to Crown point, and crossed to lake Champlain, in 
batteaux, to St. Johns, marched down Sorrel river, crossed the St. Lawrence, and 
proceeded on, to Quebec; compleated a journey from N. York only, of six 
hundred miles. On the Corps, arriving at the Governors farm, near Quebec, he 
was pleas’d to look at them, they were reduced to few in number, notwithstanding 
they had been filled up twice, since leaving Quebec in less than three years. He 
order’d each man a pint of wine, and expressed himself to one of the Grenadiers, 
of whom he used to take notice . . . I did not know you, you look so black! the 
soldier replied, we have been on black service, and have got very little white 
money for it!xlix 
 
The work of war had exacted quite a toll from the soldiers, leaving many feeling disgruntled. As 
is common with disaffected workers, the martial laborers combined to secure justice by force. 
The hard service of the Caribbean constituted one cause for the ensuing mutiny, failure to be 
returned to England at war’s end another. The catalyst for mutiny, however, came with 
alterations to the pay of soldiers. With the official cessation of hostilities in 1763, the War Office 
sought to economize by ordering that stoppages (i.e. withholdings) to soldiers’ wages of 4d. per 
diem for rations be implemented, as far as it could be done “without causing a disturbance 
among the Soldiers”.l  This hope proved forlorn. 
Miller believed that it was impossible for the soldiers to pay the four pence stoppage, “and 
keeping themselves, in the necessarys suitable to the duty, of the severe climate”, and this “ought 
to have been obvious to every one, that knew the service.” When word had been received at 
Quebec of the stoppages, “one morning after guard morning, a drum was heard, beating to arms, 
the different Corps, turned out, without Officers, and marched up to the grand parade, some 
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Officers, who wanted to Stop their men, were on the point of being shot, for it is said, the bad 
men intended to murder every one, who did not join with them, they began firing in the Street”. 
Governor Murray sent an officer inquiring as to “the meaning of their assembling in an unsoldier 
like manner,” and it was decided that the mutineers would return to their barracks, and Murray 
would speak to them on the grand parade the following day. 
 
Next morning the Gen.l, with all the Officers in the Garrison, come on the parade, 
where the soldiers were already drawn up, He then inquired what was their 
complaints, or cause of such mutinous conduct? One of the 60th Reg.t who was 
their commander and spokesman, replied, they . . . consider’d it as the heighth 
[sic] of injustice, after having at the risk of their lives, conquer’d countries, in 
every climate, that now on a general peace, the reward is want and misery, which 
unavoidably must be the case, should four pence Pr day be stopped from their pay, 
for provisions, What is left? To provide cloathing, proper for this severe climate? 
Better to die on a gibbet! Than perish by inches! 
 
The general assured them that no money would be stopped until further word was heard from 
England. The soldiers were ordered the next morning to march under their colors, and had the 
Articles of War read to them before they returned to their quarters, symbolizing their 
readmission into good faith status within the army. Shortly afterward, Murray discharged the 
ringleaders. The others were placated by the reduction of the stoppages from four pence to two 
and a half pence.li  
It is not clear exactly what role Miller played in the mutiny at Quebec. He speaks of the 
mutineers as if he was not one of them, and further isolates the “bad men” who wished to do 
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violence to the officers. At the same time, he certainly expressed his sympathy for the cause of 
the uprising. Miller also tended to play down the insurrectionary potential of the soldiers’ 
actions, whereas other reports portrayed it as more threatening. Murray deemed it a "most horrid 
Mutiny". "It was so general, so violent, and so sudden, their [sic] was no resisting at the time".lii 
And private Charles McDonell of the 60th Regiment called it a “Revolution”.liii Clearly, it was 
not in the best interests of Miller’s petition for promotion to Amherst to side with a mutiny that 
had occurred in his regiment. 
Quebec was not alone in experiencing a mutiny; from Newfoundland to Florida the troops 
rose up.liv This wave of rebelliousness would force Jeffery Amherst, commander-in-chief of 
North America, to reduce the wage deductions, placating many of the troops. And Quebec’s 
mutiny fizzled much more quickly than elsewhere. Soldiers of the 40th Regiment in Halifax and 
the 45th at Louisbourg were not won over by the reduction. Late into the spring of 1764, they 
refused to work unless freely supplied. The mutineers finally yielded, but not before extracting 
further concessions from the King, who promised to rotate all regiments so that none would 
remain in North America endlessly. But all those who remained mutinous, the monarch warned, 
would be sent to the Caribbean islands, where they would continue until “the Advisers and first 
Movers in these unmilitary, disobedient Disturbances” were given up for punishment.lv  Many 
soldiers knew all too well the dire nature of this threat. 
 
the blood of britons 
The mutiny and promised rotation did not draw James Miller’s war in America to a close. His 
regiment marched to Montreal in 1765. He served there and in the back forts for two years then 
returned to Quebec in the winter of 1767, before the regiment’s repatriation in 1768. In the 
spring of that year, Miller recorded that “the Corps . . . sailed for England, a hundred and fifty, 
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Officers included, had been filled up, four times during the course of ten years, a consumption of 
near twenty to one. Is the population of Britain and Ireland adequate to such waste of men?”lvi 
Sadly, time would answer this question in the affirmative. 
James Miller directly contributed to the defeat of the French and the Spanish in the Americas. 
A new, expanded empire constituted the output of the sum total of labors of such soldiers as 
James. These warriors built a new world order, with Britain the emergent superpower. The blood 
of Britons was the necessary ingredient to this empire; it stained the ground, washed into the 
river systems, and flowed into the Anglo Atlantic.
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